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Based on recent theorems about quantum value-indefiniteness it is conjectured that many issues
of “Born’s quantum mechanics” can be overcome by supposing that only a single pure state exists;
and that the quantum evolution permutes this state.
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I. INGREDIENTS
The following rather “iconoclastic” recasting of quan-
tum mechanics applies to the quantum formalism as out-
lined by von Neumann [1]. It will most likely survive
this theory because the definitions, conventions and re-
sults presented apply to a reversible (indeed, bijective)
state evolution, which amounts to permutations of ele-
ments in some state space. The title is taken from a
passage of Jaynes [2], presenting the current quantum
mechanical formalism as “not purely epistemological; it is
a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature,
in part incomplete human information about Nature – all
scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette
that nobody has seen how to unscramble.”
What might be the ingredients of such a quantum
omelette? First and foremost, we need to keep in mind
that we are dealing with intrinsic self-perception: no ob-
server has a “direct, detached, objective, extrinsic” view-
point; all observers are “embedded” in the system they
observe (“Cartesian prison”) [3–5].
Second, all observations are based on detector clicks.
Based on these clicks, and through projections and con-
ventions of our mind we reconstruct what we consider
the physical universe. Any inductive (re-)construction
of a representation of a universe entirely from “physical
signals” and, in particular, from detector clicks, is a sub-
tle epistemic and physical task [6, 7] involving explicit
and implicit conventions and assumptions. As we do not
possess any direct access to the system other than these
clicks we have to be careful in ascribing physical prop-
erties and existence to anything [8]. Indeed, it must be
expected that we are deceived by our preconceptions, im-
plicit conventions, and subjective expectations and pro-
jections. Jaynes called this the “Mind Projection Fal-
lacy” [2, 9], pointing out that “we are all under an ego-
driven temptation to project our private thoughts out onto
the real world, by supposing that the creations of one’s
own imagination are real properties of Nature, or that
one’s own ignorance signifies some kind of indecision on
the part of Nature. I believe that this “over-interpretation
of empirical data,” in particular, of detector clicks, is at
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the heart of many misconceptions about quantized sys-
tems.
Let us, as a starter, mention some quantum examples
of the Mind Projection Fallacy. First, consider the incli-
nations [10] yielding claims [11] of absolute, irreducible
indeterminism and randomness, demanding the “ex ni-
hilo emergence of single bits (of information).” In this
orthodox line of thought, the apparent lack of predic-
tion and control is not merely “means-relative” [12] but
“absolutely irreducible.” In particular, the possibility of
mere epistemic ignorance, originating from the limited
capacities of intrinsic observers, resulting in “pragmatic”
propositions that are true “for all practical purposes”
(FAPP) [13] but strictly false, is denied.
Rigorously speaking, any believe in (in-)determinism
is provably unprovable because, by reduction to recur-
sion theoretic unknowables (e.g., the halting problem or
the rule inference problem [14–18]), randomness as well
as determinism turn out to be undecidable. That is, one
may still be “inclined to believe in (in-)determinism” [10],
and this believe might serve as a good, pragmatic work-
ing hypothesis for various tasks; alas, strictly speaking,
any such “evidence” is no more compelling than, say, the
belief in Santa Claus.
An algorithmic proof can be sketched as follows: For
the sake of an argument against provable indeterminism,
suppose Bob presents Alice a black box, thereby wrongly
claiming that the box contains an oracle for indetermin-
ism, or even absolute randomness. Alice’s challenge is
to “verify” that this is correct. As it turns out, Alice’s
verification task is impossible if she is bound by intrinsic
algorithmic means, because every time Alice has made up
her mind that no algorithm from a particular finite set
of algorithms is generating the output of the box, by di-
agonalization Bob can construct a “faker box algorithm”
which yields a different output than Alice’s finite set of al-
gorithms; thereby giving Alice the wrong illusion of ran-
domness. With finite physical means the limit of “all
(i.e., a countable infinity of) algorithms” is impossible to
attain. But even for a finite number of algorithms, their
output behavior is FAPP impossible to predict, since the
halting time of a program of fixed length is of the order
of the Busy Beaver function of that length, and therefore
grows faster than any computable function thereof [19].
On the other hand, for the sake of an argument against
2provable determinism, suppose Bob claims that the box
behaves deterministically. In this case, Alice can be de-
ceived as well; because whenever she claims to know such
an algorithm, by diagonalization Bob can fabricate an-
other “faker algorithm” which behaves exactly as Alice’s
algorithm until she mentions her claim, and subsequently
behaves differently. In that way, Alice will never be able
to prove determinism.
Of course, the obvious “solution” would be to allow
Alice to “screw open Bob’s box” and see whether con-
tained in it there is any “paper-and-pencil Turing type
machinery;” alas this is not allowed in the intrinsic epis-
temology.
Other fallacies involve so-called “experimental proofs
of the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem” – because “how
can you measure a [proof by] contradiction?” [20]; as
well as “experimental proofs of contextuality” – what is
actually measured are violations of Boole-Bell type in-
equalities via successive measurements of counterfactual,
complementary observables that are not co-measurable
[21]. Although contextuality might be sufficient to ren-
der any experimental records (even beyond quantum cor-
relations [22]), these experiments fall short of any strict
test of the necessity of contextuality.
Still another fallacy is the assumption of the physi-
cal (co-)existence of counterfactuals (Specker’s “Infutura-
bilien” referring to scholastic debates); that is, hypothet-
ical observables that one could have, but did not mea-
sure; instead some different, complementary, observable
has been measured. We shall come back to this issue
later. Finally let me mention the fallacy of supposing
that there is some space-time theater in which events oc-
cur; rather than the “operationalization” of space-time
via events [23, 24].
II. ONTOLOGICAL SINGLE PURE STATE
CONJECTURE
So, in view of these epistemic limitations and pitfalls,
how might we “unscramble” the quantum omelette? In
what follows, the KS and related theorems will be used
as a guiding principle. But first, we need to clarify what
constitutes a pure quantum state.
Definition 1 (State). Informally, we shall assume that
a pure state is characterized by the maximal information
encodable into a physical system. This can, for instance,
be realized by a generalized beam splitter configuration
[25] with an array of detectors; of which only one clicks,
the others remain silent. Formally, a pure quantum state
can be represented by a two-valued measure either (i) on
an orthonormal basis; or (ii) on the spectral decompo-
sition of a maximal operator, from which all commuting
orthogonal projectors corresponding to (i) can be func-
tionally derived (they occur in the spectrum); or (iii) on a
context, subalgebra or block; or (iv) on the constituents of
a unitary transformation “encoding” the basis states (i)
by, say, arranging the coordinates of the basis as either
rows or columns in a matrix representation, and singling
out one of the basis elements to “be true.”
The (strong) KS theorem is usually proved by taking a
finite subset of interconnected (the dimension of the vec-
tor space must be three or higher for interconnectivity)
contexts (or any similar encoding thereof, such as maxi-
mal observables, orthogonal bases, or unitary operators),
and by demonstrating that no two-valued measure (in-
terpretable as classical truth assignment) exists on those
structures of observables if non-contextuality is required
– meaning that the measure is independent of the con-
text. In a classical (non-contextual) sense, “somewhere”
in these finite constructions any attempt to overlay a
two-valued measure – that is, any enumeration of truth
assignments regarding the propositions about outcomes
of conceivable measurements – must break down due to
inconsistencies. This also occurs, at least for some mem-
bers of an ensemble, in Boole-Bell-type configurations
[26]. Other weak forms of the KS theorem allow two-
valued measures, alas they may be too scarce to, for in-
stance, be able to separate all observables; and to allow
a homeomorphic embedding into Boolean algebras.
A formalism defining partial frame functions, similar to
the one developed in Ref. [27, 28] (instead of the “holis-
tic” frame function defined everywhere by Pitowsky’s log-
ical indeterminacy principle [29, 30]) can, in a particular
sense, be considered an “improved” version of the KS
theorem which certifies “breakdown of (non-contextual)
value definiteness” for any observable |b〉〈b| (associated
with the vector |b〉; from now on, the vector and its
associated projector will be used synonymously), if the
quantum is prepared in a particular state such that the
observable |c〉, which must be non-orthogonal and non-
collinear to |b〉, occurs with certainty. More formally,
by considering some finite construction of interconnected
contexts Γ(C1, C2, . . . , Ci), i < ∞, it turns out that
both possible value assignments v(|b〉) = 0 as well as
v(|b〉) = 1 are inconsistent with the value assignment
v(|c〉) = 1 for any non-orthogonal and non-collinear |b〉.
While, for proof technical reasons, the Abbott-Calude-
Conder-Svozil theorem (ACCS) [27] restricted the angles
to
√
5/14 ≤ |〈c | b〉| ≤ 3/√14, these boundaries have
been extended in a recent paper by Abbott, Calude, and
the author [28].
In what follows we shall argue that, by explicitly
excluding certain star-shaped configurations of contexts
characterized by an arbitrary number of orthogonal bases
with one common element (cf. Fig. 1), it is possible to
extend the ACCS theorem to the remaining “counterfac-
tual observables.”
For the sake of demonstration, consider a configuration
of three vectors |a〉 ⊥ |c〉 6⊥ |b〉, and a two-valued state
v(|c〉) = 1. Note that |a〉 lies on the plane (through
the origin) orthogonal to |c〉, whereas |b〉 lies outside
of this orthogonal plane. In terms of Greechie orthog-
onality diagrams [31], |a〉 as well as |c〉 are contained in
a star-shaped configuration of contexts characterized by
the rays perpendicular to some “true” |c〉 with v(|c〉) = 1;
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Greechie orthogonality diagram of a
star-shaped configuration, representing a common detector
observable |c〉〈c| with an overlaid two-valued assignment re-
flecting v(|c〉) = 1. It is assumed that the system is prepared
in state C4, depicted by a block colored in thick filled black;
all the other (continuity of) contexts are “phantom contexts”
colored in gray. (Compare also Ref. [27, Fig. 2].)
whereas |b〉 lies outside of “|c〉’s star.” For any such ob-
servable corresponding to |b〉 there is no consistent non-
contextual two-valued state assignment whatsoever.
That is, if |a〉 is orthogonal to |c〉 the value assignment
v(|a〉) = 0 follows from v(|c〉) = 1; but this latter assign-
ment is inconsistent with either v(|b〉) = 0 or v(|b〉) = 1
for all |b〉 non-orthogonal and non-collinear to |c〉. This
is also a consequence of Pitowsky’s logical indeterminacy
principle, which, given v(|c〉) = 1, does not allow any
globally defined two-valued state v which acquires the
values v(|b〉) = 0 or v(|b〉) = 1.
For a configuration |a〉 6⊥ |c〉 6⊥ |b〉, both |a〉 as well as
|b〉 lie outside of “|c〉’s star,” and are thus value indefi-
nite. On the other hand, if we assume |a〉 ⊥ |c〉 ⊥ |b〉 –
that is, both |a〉 as well as |b〉 are orthogonal to |c〉 (and
thus “in |c〉’s star”) – v(|a〉) = v(|b〉) = 0, even if they
are non-orthogonal. Hence, given v(|c〉) = 1, relative
to the KS assumptions, the only consistent assignments
may be made “inside |c〉’s star.” “Outside of |c〉’s star”
all “observables” are value indefinite (relative to the KS
assumptions, including non-contextuality).
How can one utilize these findings? One immediate
possibility is the construction of a quantum random num-
ber generator “certified by quantum value indefiniteness:”
prepare |c〉, measure |b〉〈b| [27].
Another intuitive speculation based on the very limited
value-definiteness allowed by the KS assumptions (in-
cluding non-contextuality) suggests a foundational prin-
ciple. While extensions [28] of the logical indeterminacy
principle and the ACCS theorem might never be able to
go beyond value indefiniteness of all but a “star-shaped”
configuration of contexts depicted in Fig. 1, I suggest to
“get rid” of even star-shaped configurations by denying
the physical co-existence of all but one context – the one
in which the quantum has been “prepared” – prior to
measurement.
Conjecture 1 (Ontological single pure state conjecture).
A quantized system is in a state corresponding to a two-
valued measure on a single definite context (orthonormal
basis, block, maximal observable, unitary operator). In
terms of observables, this translates into “ontologically
there does not exist any observable beyond the observables
representing a single definite context.”
The ontological single pure state conjecture claims that
a single quantum state is a complete theoretical represen-
tation of a physical system. Thereby it abandons omni-
existence and omniscience: it states that all other (even
hypothetically and consistently “value definite” yet coun-
terfactual) observables different from the observables as-
sociated with the unique state, and possibly ascribed to
such a system, are not value definite at all.
One should not be “tricked” into believing that such
value indefinite observables are “measurable” just be-
cause their alleged “measurement” yields outcomes; that
is, clicks in detectors that one is inclined to identify with
(pre-existing) values. These outcomes cannot reflect any
value definite property of the object prior to measure-
ment because, according to the single pure state conjec-
ture, such a value definite property simply does not exist.
Rather the detector clicks associated with the “measure-
ment” might be a very complex consequence of “the com-
plete disposition of the apparatus” [32], as well as of the
object, combined. In contradistinction, orthodox quan-
tum mechanics treats all potentially conceivable observ-
ables on an equal footing.
We shall also introduce two other concepts: a phan-
tom context, and context translation: Any context that
is not the single context/state (in which the system is
prepared) is a phantom context. And any mismatch be-
tween the preparation and the measurement may result
in the translation of the original information encoded in
a quantum system into the answer requested, whereby
noise is introduced by the many degrees of freedom of
a suitable “quasi-classical, quasi-chaotic” measurement
apparatus (for a concrete model, see, for instance, Ref.
[33]).
Note that, for this epistemic uncertainty, the result-
ing stochasticity alone cannot account for greater-than-
classical (sometimes referred to as “nonlocal”) correla-
tions; rather these reside in the quantum feature of en-
tanglement, allowing to code information across multiple
quanta without defining the (sub-)states of the individual
quanta [34]. Thereby, the holistic nature of the quantum
entanglement of multipartite system “creates” violations
of classical bounds on probabilities and expectations (see
Refs.[35, 36] for non-local classical simulations of quan-
tum and even stronger-than-quantum correlations).
For the sake of demonstration of the ontological sin-
gle pure state conjecture, consider the rule that, under
the KS assumptions (including non-contextuality), for
Specker’s “bug” configuration (Pitowsky’s “cat’s cradle”
graph) of contexts as depicted in Fig. 2, if a classical
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FIG. 2. (Color online) “Bug-type” [38] Greechie orthogonal-
ity diagram with an overlaid two-valued assignment reflecting
“v(|c〉) = 1 implies v(|b〉) = 0.” This configuration is part
of the original proof of the KS theorem [39, Γ1]. For con-
crete coordinatizations, see, for instance, the original paper
by Kochen and Specker, as well as Refs. [27, 37]. It is as-
sumed that the system is prepared in state C1, depicted by a
block colored in thick filled black; all the other six remaining
contexts C2–C7 are “phantom contexts” colored in gray.
system is prepared in a two-valued state v(|c〉) = 1 on
the context C1 (i.e. the detector corresponding to ob-
servable |c〉 clicks), and with v(|a〉) = v(|d〉) = 0 (i.e.
the detectors corresponding to observables |a〉 and |d〉
do not click), then the set of rays Γ(C1, C2, . . . , C7) al-
lows only for v(|b〉) = 0; that is, a detector correspond-
ing to observable |b〉 will not click. [A rather simple
proof by contradiction (wrongly) assumes that v(|c〉) = 1
as well as v(|b〉) = 1 can coexist consistently, thereby
leading to a complete contradiction, since in this case
the value assignment of both link observables for C3/C5
as well as C4/C5 have to be 1, alas these link observ-
ables belong to the same block C5.] That quantum me-
chanics contradicts this prediction “if v(|c〉) = 1 then
v(|b〉) = 0” is an immediate consequence of the fact
that, because |c〉 and |b〉 are not in the same block, |c〉
cannot be orthogonal to |b〉, and hence 〈c | b〉 6= 0,
implying a non-vanishing probability |〈c | b〉|2 ≥ 0.
For a concrete though not unique parametrization of
the “bug” configuration, see Fig. 4.2 in Ref. [37], in
which preparation of |c〉 ≡ (1/√3) (√2, 1, 0) and mea-
surement of |b〉 ≡ (1/√3) (√2,−1, 0) implies a proba-
bility of observing |b〉, given |c〉 of |(1/√3) (√2, 1, 0) ·
(1/
√
3)
(√
2,−1, 0) |2 = 1/9 (and not zero, as predicted
from classical non-contextuality).
However, since according to the single pure state con-
jecture only C1 exists, any argument based on the si-
multaneous co-existence of the counterfactual phantom
contexts C2–C7, and, in particular, the assumption of a
property associated with the counterfactual observable
|b〉〈b|, is inadequate for quantized systems.
III. PERSISTENT ISSUES
A. Do measurements exist?
Everett [40] and Wigner [41] observed that, if a unitary
(bijective, one-to-one, reversible, Laplacian-type deter-
ministic) quantum evolution were universally valid, then
any distinction or cut between the observer and the mea-
surement apparatus on the one side, and the quantum
“object” on the other side, is not absolute or ontic, but
epistemic, means-relative, subjective and conventional.
Because, suppose that one has defined a cut or differ-
ence between some quantum and a “quasi-classical” mea-
surement device, one could, at least in principle and if the
unitary quantum evolution is universally valid, “draw a
larger perimeter.” This “enlargement” could contain the
entire previous combination, including the quantum, the
cut, and the measurement device. If the quantum laws
are universally valid, such a quantized system should also
undergo a unitary quantum evolution. And thus, if quan-
tum mechanics is universally valid, and if it is governed
by unitary, reversible, one-to-one evolution, how could ir-
reversibility possibly “emerge” from reversibility? FAPP,
due to the limitations of the experimenter’s capacities ir-
reversibility may be means-relative; alas, strictly speak-
ing, it decays into “thin air.”
Because suppose (wrongly) a hypothetical many-to-
one function h(x) = h(y) for x 6= y exists which would
somehow ‘emerge’ from injective functions. Any such
function would have to originate from the domain of one-
to-one functions such that, for all functions f of this class,
x 6= y implies f(x) 6= f(y) – or, equivalently, the con-
trapositive statement (provable by comparison of truth
tables) f(x) = f(y) implies x = y, a clear contradiction
with the assumption.
Indeed, by Caylay’s theorem the unitary transforma-
tions on some Hilbert space H form a particular permu-
tation group consisting of those permutations preserving
the inner product. This is a subgroup of the symmet-
ric group of all permutations on H. So, strictly speak-
ing, any quantum mechanical state evolution amounts to
permuting the state, and therefore leaves no room for
“measurement.”
B. Quantum jellification
Alas, as Schro¨dinger pointed out, without measure-
ment, the quantum physicists should be troubled that,
due to the coherent superposition resulting from the co-
existence of classically mutually exclusive alternatives,
their “surroundings rapidly turning into a quagmire, a
sort of a featureless jelly or plasma, all contours becoming
blurred, we ourselves probably becoming jelly fish” [42].
The single pure state conjecture and the context trans-
lation principle would resolve this conundrum by main-
taining that there is only one state “perceived” from
many epistemic perspectives [43]; some of them causing
5noise which FAPP appears irreducible random to intrin-
sic observers. In that sense, the measurement conun-
drum, with all its variants – Schro¨dinger’s cat and jelly-
fish metaphors, as well as the Everett-Wigner critique –
can be “FAPP-resolved by means-relativity.”
C. Analogues in classical statistical mechanics
Just as Newtonian physics and electromagnetism ap-
pear to be reversible, the quantum measurement conun-
drum is characterized by the reversibility of the unitary
quantum evolution. In this respect, the (ir-)reversibility
of quantum measurements bears some resemblance to
statistical mechanics: take, for example, Loschmidt’s re-
versibility paradox – that, for large isolated systems with
reversible laws of motion, one should never observe irre-
versibility, and thus a decrease in entropy; or Zermelo’s
recurrence objection – that, as an isolated system will
infinitely often approach its initial state, its entropy will
infinitely often approach the initial entropy and thus can-
not constantly increase; or the challenge posed by the
Loschmidt-Maxwell demon [44]. And just as in statistical
mechanics, irreversibility appears to be means-relative
[12] and FAPP, yet cannot strictly be true. Also, the on-
tic determinism exposed here, accompanied by the epis-
temic uncertainty induced by context translation, results
in the fact that, at least conceptually and on the most
fundamental level, there need not be any probabilistic
description.
D. The epistemic or ontic (non-)existence of mixed
states
From a purely formal point of view, it is impossible to
obtain a mixed state from a pure one. Because again, any
unitary operation amounts to a mere basis transforma-
tion or permutation, and this cannot give rise to any in-
crease in stochasticity or “ignorance.” Since the genera-
tion of “ontologically mixed states” from pure ones would
require a many-to-one functional mapping, we conclude
that, just as irreversible measurements, genuine “onto-
logical mixed states” originating from pure states can-
not exist. Therefore, any ontological mixed state has to
be either carried through from previously existing mixed
states (if they exist), or be FAPP perceived as means-
relative. I would like to challenge anyone with doubts
to come up with a concrete experiment that would “pro-
duce” a mixed state from a pure one by purely quantum
mechanical “unitary” means.
IV. SUMMARY
In summary I hold these conjectures to be true: a
quantum state characterized by the maximal informa-
tion encoded into a physical system must formally be
represented by some orthonormal basis and a two-valued
measure thereon, or anything encoding it, such as a max-
imal operator. At any given moment, a quantized sys-
tem is in a unique, single such state. All other contexts
are phantom contexts, which have no meaning because
they are non-operational at best, and in general mislead-
ing. Randomness does not come about ex nihilo but by
context translation, whereby the many degrees of free-
dom of the measurement apparatus contribute to yield
means-relative, FAPP random outcomes. Finally, also
mixed states are means-relative and exist FAPP, but not
strictly.
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